Dirty Hands
Volume 10, Number 1
Issue date: January 2009
Submission deadline: 1 October 2008
Editor: Eric Rovie, Georgia State University
Editor’s Note for Vol. 10, No. 1:
Is it ever true that, just because of the nature of one’s job or position, one could be freed from moral responsibilities that are supposed to apply universally? Are you allowed to “play dirty” if you work in a “dirty business”? Are politicians allowed to do (or authorize others to do) terrible things simply because “that’s what politics is”? Similar questions can be asked for professionals in the law, business, medicine, and technology. Questions like these seem to be, at their core, part of the problem of dirty hands. The term “dirty hands” was coined by Sartre, but the antecedents for the problem can be found in political discussions in ancient Greece and, most famously, in Machiavelli.
In this issue of Essays in Philosophy, we will explore the nature of the problem of dirty hands. Some possible lines of discussion may include (but are not limited to):
- The relationship between dirty hands arguments and normative moral theory: is dirty hands simply a “greater good” type of consequentialism? Could one endorse dirty hands from a deontological or virtue ethical perspective?
- Are there specific limitations on the acceptable uses of the dirty hands argument? Does it work in politics but not in business? Are there scope or scale limitations that force us to consider the magnitude and importance of role of the person making the choices?
- Does dirty hands encourage a problematic approach to moral psychology? Can we really encourage people to be good and not to do bad things while still allowing them to have dirty hands in certain cases? Is there good empirical or experimental evidence to challenge or support the argument?
- Is the dirty hands argument similar to other defenses of apparent moral wrongdoing? Is it related to the doctrine of double effect or the “superior orders defense”? Is the dirty hands defense a justification, an excuse, neither, or something else entirely?
These are just a few suggestions, but related topics are encouraged and welcome.
All submissions should be sent to the General Editor via eMail: mfg1@humboldt.edu
Collective Responsibility
Volume 10, Number 2
Issue date: June 2009
Submission deadline: 1 March 2009
Editor: Loren Cannon, Humboldt State University
Editor’s Note for Vol. 10, No. 2:
The concept of collective responsibility has been of interest to philosophers since the conclusion of the Second World War and has continued to be of significance in understanding the nature of accountability in such cases as group based harm and collectively orchestrated environmental harms. Questions involving collective responsibility challenge us to understand the very nature of responsibility, especially in regards to the type of entity that can be said to be responsible for an event, action, or its consequences. Additionally, this topic brings forward questions regarding the nature of group membership and its effect on individuals. The editors of Essays in Philosophy invite submissions that serve to expand the philosophical literature on questions such as the following:
- When is it appropriate (or inappropriate) that a collective is said to be responsible for an action, event, or consequence thereof?
- What is the relationship between collective and individual responsibility? If a collective is responsible for an action or event does this allow one to infer that individual group members are also individually responsible for the same action or event? Under what conditions can one claim that responsibility distributes or is transfered from the level of the group to that of the individual?
- What is the relationship between the concept of collective responsibility and that of complicity?
- What is the nature of responsibility itself, especially in regards to certain contemporary challenges such as global warming, environmental degradation, or group based harms?
- Under what circumstances is it appropriate to claim that a collective has taken responsibility for past harms? What does this require of the collective or individuals within the collective?
- Should the scope of responsibility include accountability for certain beliefs or attitudes, and if so, how are these instantiations understood on the level of the collective?
- How are questions of collective responsibility related to those of collective action, belief, and agency?
All submissions should be sent to the General Editor via email: mfg1@humboldt.edu
Climate Ethics
Volume 11, Number 1
Issue date: January 2010
Submission deadline: 1 October 2009
Editor: Martin Schönfeld, University of South Florida
Editor’s Note for Vol. 11, No. 1:
Climate change is an emerging reality, an existential challenge, and a disaster in the making. The Stern Review (UK Treasury, 2006) identifies climate change as “the greatest market failure the world has ever seen” (‘Summary of Conclusions,’ p. 3). Climate change is human-made and appears to be the result of the dominant world-view and its attendant values, prevailing practices, and cognitive bias. Despite the presence of global warming since the 1990s, and despite a scientific literature since at least the 1950s, the topic has as yet not garnered much philosophical attention. It remains a territory for pioneers. This issue of Essays in Philosophy is intended to further the debate and to aid progress in the new field.
Essays in Philosophy invites submissions for an issue on Climate Ethics. Of particular interest would be essays that elucidate the normative or meta-ethical or socio-evolutionary dimensions of climate change. Especially welcome are contributions that would help to clarify any one of the following questions:
- (Normative) Does climate change necessitate a re-evaluation of values, and if so, in what way?
- (Meta-ethical) By definition, any sound policy response to climate change consists of values informed by factual constraints. Does the existence of a budding climate ethics serve to falsify the dogma of the naturalistic fallacy?
- (Evolutionary) Conventional approaches to climate ethics use standard tools such as the precautionary principle, the rate of discounting, the principle of utility, or the rationality of the market. Conventional quandaries are the difficulty of measuring catastrophe, the problem of sacrifice, and paradoxes of future generations. Overall, such discourse engages with climate change in terms of threats, risks, and costs. Is this the best we can do, or are there more creative, perhaps more enlightened ways of conceptualizing climate change? For example, is climate change an opportunity for social evolution, and if so, how?
All submissions should be sent to the General Editor via email: mfg1@humboldt.edu
- Click for the main Journal page
- Click for Submission Guidelines
- Click for Journal policies
- Click for the Board of Advisors
- Click to eMail the General Editor