The Ems Dispatch
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      The diplomatic situation after July 6 was anything but simple. The French would dispatch Vincent Benedetti to meet with William at Ems. His first meeting with The King on July 9 would accomplish little from the French point of view as William would make it a point of personal honor that he would refrain from using his regal authority to influence Leopold’s decision, knowing that he would withdraw only at the express demand of the Prussian King. The very next day, Bismarck would utilize the Official Press to attack the French assumption of involvement in a Spanish Constitutional question, further asserting that the Prussian government would continue its policy of non-interference and her unwillingness to negotiate with France “in anger.”15

 

       By the 12th of July, Karl Anton, under pressure from the Spanish who by this time had “cold feet”, would withdraw Leopold’s candidacy on his son’s behalf. Problem solved? Not quite. The French would make two more “demands” of William in an effort to obtain satisfaction for the affront now that the danger of war had been averted . Napoleon, independent of Benedetti’s mission at Ems, would “suggest” that William write a personal letter to him asserting that William’s implicit support for the Candidacy was in no way an attempt to wound French pride, and that he grant Official sanction to the renunciation 16. Meanwhile, Benedetti, having already received William’s royal approval of Karl Anton’s decision, would be instructed to press for “guarantees into the future” that Leopold would never again seek the Spanish Crown17.

 

     On July 13, 1870, Bismarck would release to the press his version of the events that had befallen his King the day before. The Ems Dispatch would prove to be the straw that broke the camels back of the French patience. The reaction of French public opinion was swift in light of the Prussian "insult" upon their national honor and pride .The popular reaction in the south German states was equally swift; the French insult of the Prussian King would arouse German nationalist feeling to the point that Bismarck could now move towards his goal of unification. As a further bonus, France would find herself isolated from her European neighbors, who felt that France was getting the war that they had been "asking" for.  The Russian Minister in Berlin, Baron Pavel Petrovich Ouvril sums it up nicely, "It [the war] is a success fostered and sanctioned by the maladroitness of France. 18