Chapter 4: Efficiency and Technical Progress
Perfect competition
is our benchmark. What are the conditions required for a well-functioning
competitive market?
Describe a competitive equilibrium, and why is
it efficient?
Pareto optimality: Can the equilibrium be replaced
by another that would increase the welfare of some without reducing
the welfare of others?
But what about distributive justice? The above
view of social welfare is based on the notion that value is revealed
through willingness-to-pay along a demand curve. But people who
value goods/services but lack ability to pay are omitted
.
Describe consumer and producer surplus in a competitive
market. How is it that they are maximized (assuming a well-functioning
competitive market) in a competitive equilibrium?
Maximizing total surplus yields a welfare maximum
in a market setting. We say that this outcome results in allocative
efficiency because one could not re-allocate (i.e., produce
either more or less) production and increase total surplus.
Why does the allocatively efficient market outcome
imply P = MC at the level of the perfectly competitive firm? Draw
diagram
.
Market Failure: Monopoly/cartel
.
Deadweight loss as inefficiency
.
But what about situations that feature large economies
of scale (define
)? Relate to Natural Monopoly
.
Public utilities and regulation (later)
.
Economies of scale can and do also lead to oligopoly
structures, which may feature interfirm rivalry but may not generate
P = MC outcomes. Examples: Cournot
.
What about efficiency under conditions of product
differentiation? The assumption in a perfectly competitive market
is that products are essentially identical
. Link to monopolistic
competition equilibrium, which is not economically efficient
(production does not occur at minimum cost).
Estimates of the Welfare Loss from Monopoly:
How do we compute the area of deadweight loss (assume
linearity for simplicity
), which illustrates allocative
inefficiency?
Another source of inefficiency: The resources expended
in bidding for and competing for the opportunity to be a monopolist
with market power created by government, or in general to get $
or valuable resources from government. Bribes, political contributions,
etc. Called rent-seeking behavior. Examples: Telecommunications
Act of 1996; logging road subsidies; grazing subsidies; protection
of 1872 mining act. One might also view much of image advertising
as a form of wasteful rent-seeking behavior
.
Harberger: Welfare losses are less than 1 percent
of GNP.
Cowling and Mueller: DWL is approximately equal
to 0.5*profit, where profit is
(P-AC)*Q. Generated DWL estimate of 4 percent of
GNP.
Technical Progress: The overwhelming source
of productivity gains in the US economy has been technological progress.
Increases in productivity (more output for a given amount of input)
is the key source of increases in wealth in an economy.
Schumpeter Hypothesis: Excess profit (P
> MC) helps firms afford socially desirable R&D in productivity-enhancing
technology.
Alternative Hypotheis: Rivalry and competition
creates an incentive to find product-enhancing or cost-lowering
innovations. Rewards to winner position (licensing income, first
mover advantage).
Terminology: basic research (not directed toward
particular profit opportunity); applied research (basic research
findings directed toward potentially profitable products or services
or cost-reducing process changes); development leads to commercial
application of applied research finding, which eventually diffuses
through the economy by way of licensing or imitation or theft (e.g.,
Hong Kong).
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