Econ
423 Exam #1, Fall 2005 – Prof Hackett Your Name: Answer Key (answers in blue)
PART
I -- 1. (12 pts) Suppose that in addition to the status quo (current management
system), four policy options are being considered in the context of a natural
resource management decision. Five members of society are affected by the
management decision. The table below shows how these five people feel about the
proposed management options relative to the status quo. The numbers represent
the amount (in units of utility) by which the different options make them
better off or worse off relative to the status quo.
|
Policy
Options |
Affected Members of
Society |
Net
Social Utility |
||||
|
Ari |
Nick |
Ivy |
Felicia |
Miranda |
||
|
Option
1 |
60 |
20 |
30 |
40 |
120 |
270 |
|
Option
2 |
30 |
0 |
20 |
-20 |
170 |
200 |
|
Option
3 |
0 |
-15 |
15 |
30 |
30 |
60 |
|
Option
4 |
-30 |
30 |
0 |
-30 |
200 |
170 |
1.a.
Compute the net social utility for each option and report it in the table
above.
1.b.
Which of the above options, if any, is Pareto efficient relative to the status
quo? ____1____
1.c.
Which of the above options, if any, is Kaldor-Hicks efficient relative to the status quo? _____1____
1.d.
Which of the above options, if any, is utilitarian-ethical relative to the
status quo? ____1_____
Next 3 questions (4 unit
students only): Assume an otherwise well-functioning competitive market
with the following:
Demand:
P = 1050 – 0.2Q; Private-cost supply: P = 50 + 0.3Q. Production of each unit of
output Q above leads to a marginal external cost of $200, which implies
social-cost supply: P = 250 + 0.3Q.
2.
(8 points) Assuming firms can freely pollute in the absence of regulation,
compute the "free market" equilibrium P, Q, and total gross gains
from trade (CS + PS) using the private-cost supply equation. Show your work.
1050 – 0.2q = 50 + 0.3q č q = 2000 p =
1050 – 0.2(2000) = 650
Total gross gains = [(1050 – 50)*2000]/2 = 1,000,000
Equilibrium P = $650, Q = 2000 units, and total
gross gains from trade = $1,000,000
3. (8 points) Compute the
dollar amount of total external cost generated when firms can freely pollute in
the market equilibrium above, and derive the true net gains from trade.
Show your work.
TEC = q*MEC = 2000*200 = 400,000
Tot. net gains = Total gross gains – TEC =
1,000,000 – 400,000 = 600,000
Total external cost = $400,000
and
total net gains from trade = $600,000
4. (8 points) Assuming firms
pay a Pigouvian tax and thus operate along the social
cost supply curve, compute the "socially optimal" equilibrium P, Q,
and true net gains from trade. Assume the Pigouvian
tax revenue fully offsets any remaining negative externalities. Show your work.
1050 – 0.2q = 250 + 0.3q č q = 1600 p =
1050 – 0.2*1600 = 730
True net gains = [(1050 – 250)*1600]/2 = 640,000
Equilibrium P = $730, Q = 1600 units, and total
gains from trade = $640,000
Next 2 questions (3 unit students only)
2.
(12 pts) Carefully draw and fully label a supply-demand diagram with negative
externalities that illustrates (i) the free-market
equilibrium when firms only pay marginal private costs, and (ii) the socially
optimal equilibrium based on a Pigouvian tax. (iii)
Show the difference in equilibrium prices and equilibrium quantities, and (iv) show the inefficiency caused by negative externalities.
See Figure 4.4 in
2nd edition of textbook
3.
(12 pts) Carefully draw and fully label a supply-demand diagram with positive
externalities that illustrates (i) the free-market
equilibrium when demand only reflects private benefits to the buyers, and (ii)
the socially optimal equilibrium with demand based on social benefits. (iii)
Show the difference in equilibrium prices and equilibrium quantities. (iv) In one sentence, describe an example of a market with
positive externalities, and in one sentence describe an efficiency-enhancing
government intervention applicable to your example.
See Figure 4.1 and accompanying narrative in 2nd edition
of textbook.
Remainder of exam: (all students)
Question 4 or 5. (10 points) Suppose that there are 1000 units of a nonrenewable
resource available over two periods (0 and 1). Demand in each period is given
by P = 2000 - Q. Marginal cost is a constant 100 in both periods. The discount
rate is 20 percent. What is the dynamically efficient allocation of the 1000
units of the nonrenewable resource? Get within $5 of the PV of marginal profit
being equal – show your work using Hotelling’s rule.
See Powerpoint slides and 2nd edition
textbook content in chapter 5 for details on how to do this.
Exact solution: Q0 = 627.3, Q1 = 372.7.
Check on work – Does the division of the 1000 units as outlined
above satisfy Hotelling’s rule?
P0 = 2000 – 627.3 =
1372.7; Period zero marginal profit (P0 – MC) = 1272.7
P1 = 2000 – 372.7 =
1627.3; PV of period one marginal
profit = (P1 – MC)/1.2 =
1272.7
Therefore Hotelling’s rule holds – the PV
of marginal profit is equal over the two periods….
Q0 = 627.3
Q1 = 372.7
Question
5 or 6 (9 points) (i) Carefully
draw and fully label a diagram that shows the price trend line for the question
above. (ii) Draw a second price trend line in the same diagram for the same
situation, except that the discount rate is substantially higher and label it
as such. (iii) Draw a third price trend line in the same diagram for the same
situation, except that the discount rate is zero and label it as such. (iii) Briefly
but succinctly explain in words how discount rates affect the price trend line
for non-renewable resources.
Time

PART
II: Matching (3 points each). Clearly write the letter for the word or phrase
(on the left) beside the description (on the right) that matches it. Each word
or phrase has at most one uniquely correct match.
|
Word or Phrase |
Description |
|
A. High discount rates |
1. B The property rights regime that describes the ownership of the Humboldt
Bay National Wildlife Refuge. |
|
B. State (government)
property |
2. Q The concept underlying deontological ethics. |
|
C. Usufructuary
rights |
3. S These often have secondary markets where previously used resource competes
with "virgin" resource sold in primary markets. |
|
D. Kaldor-Hicks
efficient |
4. K The property rights regime in which the rights of access, withdrawal,
management, and exclusion are held in common by a group of proprietors. |
|
E. Tragedy of the commons |
5. R The gap between price and marginal cost that occurs in competitive
commodity markets due to resource scarcity. |
|
F. Positive externality |
6. N Occurs when price is above equilibrium in a well-functioning competitive
market. |
|
G. Buy too much |
7. F An
external benefit generated from production and exchange and enjoyed without
payment by members of society. |
|
H. Pigouvian
tax |
8. A These will cause current nonrenewable resource prices to be relatively
low, but future prices to be relatively high. [Note: also accepted L, but not
as good] |
|
I. |
9. G Consumers do this in markets suffering from unresolved
negative externalities because price reflects marginal private cost rather
than marginal social cost. |
|
J. Pareto efficient |
10. H Name of a policy intervention that internalizes negative externalities. |
|
K. Common property |
11. J This efficiency criterion can only be satisfied when a policy option
makes some better off and nobody worse off relative to the status quo. |
|
L. Appropriation
externality |
12. I When a choice is made in the context of scarcity, this is the value of
the best option that had to be given up. |
|
M. Open access |
13. C Certain use and withdrawal rights to property that is owned by others. |
|
N. Excess supply |
14. O Measure of market inefficiency that represents lost gains from trade. |
|
O. Deadweight (social) loss |
15. E Occurs in a common-pool resource under open access
conditions (or other failed property rights systems) due to self-interested
appropriators. [Note: also accepted L, but not as good] |
|
P. Consequentialism |
|
|
Q. Categorical imperative |
|
|
R. Marginal profit |
|
|
S. Recyclable natural
resources |
|