<![CDATA[
<body>
<h2>Table of Contents: </h2>
<h4>Select Slide or Start at the <a href="sld001.htm">beginning</a></h4>
<ul>
<li><a href="sld001.htm">Diagram: Continuing Previous Example</a><br>
<li><a href="sld002.htm">Hotelling's Rule</a><br>
<li><a href="sld003.htm">Hotelling Rents</a><br>
<li><a href="sld004.htm">Diagram: Hotelling Rents, Dynamically Efficient
Allocation, Year 0</a><br>
<li><a href="sld005.htm">Recyclable Resources</a><br>
<li><a href="sld006.htm">Primary and Secondary Recyclable Resource
Markets</a><br>
<li><a href="sld007.htm">Renewable Resources</a><br>
<li><a href="sld008.htm">Maximum Sustainable Yield</a><br>
<li><a href="sld009.htm">Sustainable Yield Case Study: US Land Management
Legislation </a><br>
<li><a href="sld010.htm">Recreation Values are 75% of Economic Value of
US National Forests </a><br>
<li><a href="sld011.htm">Fisheries Economics</a><br>
<li><a href="sld012.htm">Declines in Landings, Marine Fisheries
(Table)</a><br>
<li><a href="sld013.htm">More on Declines in Marine Fisheries </a><br>
<li><a href="sld014.htm">Role of Excessive Harvest Rates</a><br>
<li><a href="sld015.htm">Technological Advance in Fishing</a><br>
<li><a href="sld016.htm">Open Access "Management"</a><br>
<li><a href="sld017.htm">Excessive Harvest Capacity</a><br>
<li><a href="sld018.htm">Why? Limited Seasons Drive Bigger Vessels
Which Drive Shorter Seasons....</a><br>
<li><a href="sld019.htm">Cheating On Quotas</a><br>
<li><a href="sld020.htm">Other Fishery Management Problems </a><br>
<li><a href="sld021.htm">Too Much Fishing Effort--Disaster </a><br>
<li><a href="sld022.htm">Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQs) </a><br>
<li><a href="sld023.htm">ITQs: Incentives To Reduce
Overcapitalization</a><br>
<li><a href="sld024.htm">Possible Problems With ITQs</a><br>
<li><a href="sld025.htm">World Bank Helped Create Overcapitalization</a><br>
<li><a href="sld026.htm">Aquaculture </a><br>
<li><a href="sld027.htm">Aquaculture Problems </a><br>
<li><a href="sld028.htm">Common-Pool Resources (CPRs) </a><br>
<li><a href="sld029.htm">Lack of Effective Governance Leads to Depletion
</a><br>
<li><a href="sld030.htm">Gordon Diagram ("Q" is Effort)</a><br>
<li><a href="sld031.htm">Algebra for Gordon Diagram </a><br>
<li><a href="sld032.htm">Describing Rent Dissipation, Group Optimum </a><br>
<li><a href="sld033.htm">Hardin Quote: Tragedy of the Commons </a><br>
<li><a href="sld034.htm">Gordon Quote </a><br>
<li><a href="sld035.htm">Local Self-Governance Can Succeed</a><br>
<li><a href="sld036.htm">Conditions Associated with Successful Local
Self-Governance</a><br>
<li><a href="sld037.htm">Resources for the Future: Scarcity</a><br>
<li><a href="sld038.htm">Malthus</a><br>
<li><a href="sld039.htm">Role of Markets in Responding to Resource Scarcity
</a><br>
<li><a href="sld040.htm">Malthus and Static Technologies Assumption</a><br>
<li><a href="sld041.htm">Hotelling's Rule and Resource Scarcity</a><br>
<li><a href="sld042.htm">Little Evidence of Growing Marginal
Hotelling Rents</a><br>
<li><a href="sld043.htm">Non-Marketed Resources Suffer Degradation</a><br>
<li><a href="sld044.htm">Privatization the Solution?</a><br>
<li><a href="sld045.htm">Localized Scarcity </a><br>
</ul>
</body>
</html>
]]>