Philosophy 399, On Certainty

One-credit reading group/seminar, Fall 2002, CRN 43714, 3:30-5 Thursdays, UANX 152

J. W. Powell, phone 826-5753, e-mail jwp2@humboldt.edu

Benjamin Shaeffer, phone 826-5755, e-mail hbs1@humboldt.edu

Description:

Here's the Argument from Illusion, perhaps the only argument in philosophy:

The way something looks to us could be the same whether it is based on reality or on illusion. Therefore we cannot tell which of our perceptions are real. Therefore nothing is certain.

Let's do this over with the fine print included.

The way something looks to us {or seems to us, or is perceived by us, or is experienced by us, or appears to us, or whatever} could be the same whether it is based on reality or on illusion {a technical term including not only Muller-Lyer diagrams and other optical illusions but also the stick dipped in water that appears bent, dreams, mirages, hallucinations, delusions, mirages, afterimages, tricks of light, holograms, sensation-altering disease, and an indefinite list of etc.}

Therefore we cannot tell whether the way something looks to us is based on reality. Therefore nothing is certain. {Or, we do not know those things we take for granted we know, or we do not know anything, or all is open to doubt, or we do not know how things are.}

The Argument from Illusion, then, in the form given above, is an argument for skepticism. This is the topic for the course. That does not mean this is the only thing we will talk about. We are also going to work on problems of philosophical method, the status of philosophy and its relationship to doing anything other than philosophy, and the status of Cartesian dualism among some contemporary issues in philosophy.

Here's what we'll read:

Rene Descartes, Meditations I and II from Meditations on First Philosophy, or something similar.

G.E. Moore, two or three essays, from "A Defense of Common Sense," "Certainty,"and "Proof of an External World"

Ludwig Wittgenstein, On Certainty.

--And our own work in response to the above. We may use secondary sources--at the moment I'm rereading a fight between Norman Malcolm and John Cook on how to understand W's On Certainty, waged in a journal a few years ago. Benjamin has an article by Dretske entitled "Epistemic Operators." I've got a piece drafted called "On the Nonexistence of Perceptions."

The Wittgenstein is backordered through the bookstore. We'll hand out copies of the essays by Descartes and Moore in class, and Wittgenstein as well if it's necessary. Those who wish to start reading before we meet should be able to find those essays. If you cannot, send either of us an e-mail note.

Requirements: Each student enrolled needs to write a half-page note every other week and make copies for all participants, and then a three-page summary paper, with copies for everyone, at the end. We're not going to nag people and we're not going to remind you--take care of this yourself. This may be more work than is quite fair for one credit, so let us be clear--credit is not what this course is about. We are organizing it for our own benefit, though we have confidence students who work hard will also find it valuable. We are going to grapple with an old, central problem in philosophy that is still devouring innocent philosophers--who could ask for anything more? We will try as hard as we can to make some progress. John is convinced there is some progress to be made, and will work to articulate that in a paper by the end of the seminar.