Philosophy 399, Philosophical Methods
1 Credit; Fall 1999; Siemens Hall 120, Mondays, 4-5:30,
J. W. Powell, 110 UANX, phone 826-5753, e-mail jwp2@axe; Office hours 11 MW (not F), 2-4 Tuesday, and by appt.
Feel free to stop by any time-if I'm not teaching your odds are good of catching me in my office.
Description: For a couple of years now the one-credit reading groups I've led or co-led have gravitated toward (some would say have mired down in) questions about methods, whether the alleged topic was intentional semantics or dichotomies or certainty. Some of this has to be my fault. I have repeatedly stressed examples of conversations outside philosophy as a guide to how we have to make sense of the work we do in philosophy. How should we think about this emphasis? Is it anti-philosophical? Some think it raises issues about whether philosophy done without these kinds of examples can apply to anything outside itself, and therefore the issue of whether philosophy can be a self-sufficient discipline.
This semester I would like to address these questions head on. We'll look at some classic readings in which those methods are used, and characterize the methods and some implications. Then we'll look at arguments. One task has to do with the arguments for these methods of appealing to examples-I'd like to put together a package of those arguments in the most severely plain and simple package possible, something no one has done well yet, as far as I know. Another has to do with articulating the important objections to those methods. The most serious objections, two of them, have been put forward by John R. Searle and by Paul Grice. We will read and plainly state and then evaluate those objections. As part of that section of the course, we'll read a draft of a paper I've written on Searle, and we'll rip that limb from limb. Finally, there's an issue regarding the analogy of philosophy with other disciplines in which people do work and come up with new results-analogies especially with the sciences. Does philosophy hold the possibility of discovery or construction of new theories in the way that physics provided new theories of falling or fire? For instance, could we come up with insights into what beliefs are, which change how we think about (and so talk about) beliefs, or insights into human action or knowledge or consciousness or perception? This issue is the obverse of the question whether philosophy is stuck with the ways that nonphilosophers would speak of such matters as beliefs, actions, knowledge, etc.
Course Requirements: Students will read the articles, be present for the discussions, and be willing to participate either by speaking up or by writing notes to the class. Every other week, students will bring copies of a half-page or longer written response for every member of the group. Students will write a 3-page note at the end, due the next-to-last class so we may share them with everyone as well. I'll make all e-mail addresses available to all, for those who wish to use that for discussion. Please note the requirements are heavy for a one-credit course-the course is not primarily about getting credit but about working on a live issue in philosophy where there may be progress to be made.
Readings: (we will change this as we go if necessary)
(Samples)
(Arguments for)
(Arguments against)
(Assessments)
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