Lecture Notes on J.J. Thomson's
"A Defense of Abortion"
Philosophy 304, Summer 1999
Michael F. Goodman
Department of Philosophy
Humboldt State University
Go to:
This may be the best paper ever written by a philosopher on the moral controversy of abortion. Its lucidity, clarity and detail mark it as a classic in the philosophical literature of the 20th century. This does not mean, of course, that we will agree with everything Thomson has to say, or with her reasoning. Nonetheless, there is much to consider here and much to discuss.
The very beginning of the paper presents us with an argument about the status of the fetus. Thomson points out that just because there is a continuous line from the conception of the fetus to its being a child (who are presumably persons), it does not follow that the fetus is a person (or that the conceptus is either). How can one draw a line somewhere on the continuum from conceptus to childhood before which X is not and after which X is a person? The line would be arbitrary, or at very least not well enough argued for to convince the great majority. While she seems inclined to believe the fetus to be a person before birth, she refuses to push the point. This must be, I think, because she intends to argue that it doesn't really matter; abortion is all right even if the fetus is a person.
So, Thomson "gives the premise". That is, she is willing, for the sake of argument, to grant that the fetus is a person from the moment of conception (though she really doesn't believe it is from that distant point). Her idea is that that premise will not matter much in showing that abortion is morally permissible. Note that this is a huge point, because the status of the fetus argument had been, up to Thomson's publication of the essay, the overriding argument. She intends to change all that.
Enter the Society of Music Lovers. You're kidnapped and hooked up to a famous violinist, who is using your kidneys to stay alive. If you unplug yourself, then the violinist will die; if you don't, then you'll spend nine months attached to him, after which you can go about your business.
Aside: Would it make a difference if you weren't kidnapped, but rather gave your consent and after 6 weeks changed your mind and wanted to be unplugged? Initially, Thomson's example strikes us as analogous to rape, or perhaps a case of deceptive artificial insemination by a mad scientist.
The violinist has a right to life; there is no doubt of that, so far as Thomson is concerned. And, on the premise that the fetus is a person, then the fetus has a right to life as well. Even in the case of rape. This is of vital importance, because one apparently cannot simply disregard what might be called the "innocent" in these parallel cases, i.e., the violinist and the fetus. They are beings in their own right, nay, more than beings, human beings, persons (take note that we've discussed the distinction between 'human' and 'person' in previous lectures). Thomson's analogy works.
At this point, Thomson gives some talk of the "extreme view" in opposition to abortion. As she points out, it is fairly rare that an individual will take such an extreme view, but it does exist.
- Abortion is wrong even to save the life of the mother. (We have here the issue of killing or letting die.)
- Abortion to save the life of the mother is morally permissible, but it must be performed by the mother, not by any third party (such as medical staff). (While this is not an issue of killing or letting die, it is clearly an issue which separates the mother from the rest of the world, as though she is the only one to decide on the matter; she is alone in the decision and in the action.)
Aside: Sometimes we see that though a person has some right, it is not in the capacity of the person to see that her/his right is not violated. In short, we need help at times to make sure our rights are not violated.
- If the mother's life is not at risk, then the fetus' right to life is stronger than any right the mother might invoke in order to abort the fetus. (Example: If the mother is taking on a promotion at work which will demand more of her time and energy, then having a child will make it impossible for her to take this promotion. The argument is that the fetus' right to life is stronger than the mother's right to move ahead in her career. If it is, then we need to know the grounds for the strength of the right.)
One of the primary points of the paper comes along just now: Thomson writes, "...the right to life consists not in the right not to be killed but rather in the right not to be killed unjustly." (Thomson, 238) Now, then, if you have the right to say what goes on to your body, and if you gave no consent to the Society of Music Lovers, or the violinist, to use your body as a kidney machine (there is no right to the use of your body without your consent), then even though the violinist has a right to life, he does not have a right to use your body and you have the right to unplug yourself because doing so would not constitute violating anyone's right, either to the use of your body or to continued existence.
It should come as no surprize that the analogy to the fetus and to abortion works pretty well. If you gave no consent for the fetus to use your body, then, even though the fetus has a right to life, it has no right to use your body. Hence, aborting it is not unjust killing, just killing.
OK. Enough of that. Thomson thinks she's established the point well enough. Let's go on to the case where a woman has sex knowing that she might get pregnant and becomes pregnant. Did she invite the fetus into her body? No. Hence, what is the difference between this case and the case of rape? One answer is that the woman didn't take precautions for not getting pregnant. Question: How is this relevant? Answer: Open window. Burgler enters. Hence, burgler has the right to be there. Say No More. Thomson's analogies with "people-seeds" and so on are really very creative and seem to most people to make the point very well. Not to say that there is no controversy. One might still take the position that if you do open your window and people seeds come in and take root (as a result, even, of your putting in screens to keep them out and there being a tiny hole in the mesh of the screen), you cannot pull them out. The only option here is to never open your window. Hmm.
Thomson is quick to point out that she believes there are some cases in which the fetus apparently does have the right to use the woman's body, e.g., voluntary pregnancy (but even this relies on the fetus having some right to life, which many people do not, as does Thomson for the sake of argument, grant).
There is also the question of moral decency to be considered. What if it turns out that you're attached to the violinist, not by consent, but this attachment does you little or no harm. Now if you were attached for five or ten years, of course it would be a great hardship. But, nine months, or three months, or two days. Wouldn't we have a tendency to think it would be morally decent of you to remain plugged in? Perhaps so, but does this "we ought to be morally decent" give the right to the violinist to use your body as a kidney machine, even if there is little or no harm which will come to you? Thomson says "no".
Aside: What is this moral decency? Is there any sort of obligation attending it? If not, then what strength does it have? That is, what moral force? None that I can see. Hence, we might say, "It would be nice of you to stay plugged in, but you're not in the least morally obligated to do so.". I suggest that 'moral' in 'moral decency' is out of place, a remnant of a past era where decency was thought to have moral connotations. It's not that way anymore.
Of course the Henry Fonda example is simply priceless, and it lends a tone of radicalness to the paper, even today. To talk about Minimally Decent, Good, Very Good, and Splendid Samaritanism might give us a picture of there being degrees of moral obligation. It seems this is not Thomson's goal. She is arguing that no person is morally required to make great sacrifices to sustain the life of another person who has no right to demand such sacrifices. Cannot Henry Fonda legitimately demand (on moral grounds) that we walk across the room to touch his fevered brow? We want to say "yes", but we need to know what the moral ground is for his demand. That is what we lack.
To push this in the case of abortions, we need the moral ground of the mother's right to the use of her body as well as the fetus' moral ground for use of same. In the end it is unclear to many people that Thomson has provided either to such an extent that is needed to settle the abortion controversy once for all.
Assignment: Write a brief essay on how Thomson handles the issue of abortion to save the life of the mother. Is she for it or against it. Assess her argument. Please post your answers to my E-mail no later than Friday, 18 June 1999, 12pm